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I .
Three fu l l years after the passage of the 1913 Natives' Land Act, the
Magistrate of Middelburg, RF Al ing wrote to the Secretary of Native
Af fa i rs . The subject of his letter was the farm Mooifontein, situated
only 20 kilometres from the town. The farm at that time was not
only occupied and cul t ivated by Afr icans but negotiations to sell the
farm to Pixley Isaka ka Seme, a Johannesburg lawyer, had reached
an advanced stage. Al ing had f i rm views on the subject.
"As it is imperative that the farm should not pass
into Native hands, I take it that you w i l l leave no
stone unturned to pip O'Neil (the owner) and Seme's
l i t t l e game in the b u d " "
The magist rate 's concern had its legal or ig ins in the 1913 Land Act
which came into effect on 20 June 1913. In terms of the Act both
independent Afr ican cu l t i va t ion and land ownership in 'wh i l e ' areas
was proh ib i ted . In the mind of the o f f ic ia l the consideration lhal
local white farmers were angry over the existence of a 'kaf fer lokas ie ' ,
was probably equal ly pressing.
A l i ng ' s earnest entreaty was successful. On 6 July 1916 the Registrar
of Deeds refused to cede transfer of Mooifonlein from O'Neil to Seme
and the sale fe l l through. In August the Afr ican occupants of(2)Mooifontein were expel led.
Before turn ing lo lh.= wider signif icance of this episode, I shbl l
narrate (he Mooifontein happenings more fu l l y and place them in their
regional context. In th is way it w i l l become clear how it was possible
for "nat ives lo defy the Authorit ies for three years . "
2.
II.
In 1913 settlement patterns within the distr ict of Middelburg had not
yet been f ixed. In general terms, Africans occupied the northern
bushveld area and whites occupied the d is t r i c t ' s southern highveld.
There were however numerous exceptions. In the north white farmers,
both poor and wealthy, were intruding into the bushveld. In the
south, African squatt ing was widespread. Actual Afr ican landownership
was l imited. In the north there were ten African locations, granted
at various stages by the ZAR and the Transvaal governments in
recognition of dense African settlement in par t icu lar local i t ies. In
the south, African land ownership was more l imited. Before 1905
Africans were technically prohibited from owning land although mission
(4)
societies l ike the BMS held land on behalf of Afr icans. In 1905
the Supreme Court judgement Tsewu v Registrar of Deeds; reversed
this position in the Transvaal . Between 1905 and 1913 there was
only one instance of African land purchase in the Middelburg d is t r ic t .
This was the farm Doornkop, situated just north of the town. The
absence of further African land purchase is in t r igu ing and suggests
that Middelburg' s highveld Africans were too poor to go in for such
ventures. The progress of a South African 'peasantry ' has been wel l -
documented but there are also signs that, in some areas, poverty
(7)
and servitude rather than wealth and independence dominated. In
Middelburg where the Ndebele had been crushed and distr ibuted as
labourers in 1883 there appear to have been few African cul t ivators
(8)
capable of buying land.
When the Land Act came into force, one last chance for aspirant
African landowners remained. Land purchase became i l legal unless
such purchase was being negotiated before the Act came into force.
Mooifontein was a large farm of 3346 morgen. It was owned by R
O'Neil of Belfast, a small v i l lage to the east of Middelburg. Although
O'Neil owned a number of farms he did not consider himself wealthy.
He lacked the capital to begin commercial farming and appears to
have rel ied largely on African squatter farmers for hi's income. The
1913 Land b i l l threatened O'Neil 's way of l i fe almost as much as it
did that of the squatters.
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Mooifontein in 1913 was a l ready occupied by n ine ' f a rm labourers '
who in February of that year had signed a contract w i th O*Neil to
c u l t i v a t e some l a n d . O 'Ne i l ' s terms were qu i te generous. The nine
men were to work for three months (wi thout p a y ) . In re tu rn they
were appa ren t l y a l lowed g raz ing and c u l t i v a t i o n r i g h t s on the fa rm.
In add i t i on the i r ex t ra labour could be procured by O'Neil at £1/10
(9)
a month.
In A p r i l 1913 O'Nei l responded to the impending passage of the b i l l
by s ign ing another con t rac t , th is time w i th 'Job Ngema' and 44 other
A f r i cans . He of fered Ngema residence, c u l t i v a t i o n and g raz ing r i g h t s
for £400 p a and an opt ion to purchase 1000m at £6 /m. (The going
ra te at the time was between £2-£3 /m. ) It was not easy to sell
land because c r e d i t , even from the Land Bank, was t i g h t . Sales to
Af r i cans were therefore a t t r a c t i v e because a h igh p r ice could be
expected. It was not long before the ne ighbours of Mooifontein began
to compla in . A prominent member of the local Farmers Associat ion
gave h is i n te rp re ta t i on of O 'Ne i l ' s p l ans . "The terms of the lease
are:- to es tab l i sh na t ives who own d raugh t an imals ( t rekd ie ren) and
who are able to sow on the i r own for the landowner. The owner
then g ives ha l f of the crops to the n a t i v e s " . As fa r as the member
was concerned th is was a way by which landowners "escape the
Nat ives Land Ac t " . He was en t i re l y cor rec t . O'Nei l was s ide-
stepping the Act. Moreover he had more than one step to his
repe r to i re . It came to l igh t that O'Neil had apparen t l y g iven Ngema
permission to sub- le t to other wander ing A f r i cans . One such A f r i can
who set great store by Mooifontein was a church min is te r , HR
Ngcay iya . He bewai led the fact thai "our late Greatest Helper Mr
Sauer 's Act is be ing so un jus l l y cons t rued" . He asked if it would
not be possible for the government to suggest Mooifontein as a
home for homeless A f r i cans . " I t w i l l be a k i n d of re l ie f (to) 300 or
400 fami l ies w i th the i r stock (and they) would ce r ta i n l y l ive
comfor tab le . "
Alarmed by the prospect of a densely set t led A f r i can farm on the
h i g h v e l d , the Nat ive Commissioner (NC) of M idde lburg invest igated
and prevented Ngema from exerc is ing the opt ion of purchase on the
grounds that he had not done so before the b i l l was passed. O'Neil
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was thus temporari ly stymied. In October therefore he produced an
elaborate smokescreen by informing the NC that he was about to
"car ry on farming operations on a large scale" and required at least
50 nat ive famil ies as labourers. His real intention was to go in for
a hybr id form of sharecropping described above. O'Neil bluffed
that he had sought the Prime Min is ter 's view on the matter and had
toyed, with the option of se l l ing , but had dropped the idea. The NC
was unimpressed with this explanation and attached greater credence
to the cont inuing al legat ions of white farmers that their labour was
being enticed to Mooifontein.
Offical action against O'Neil was not however launched. The Under
Secretary for Native Af fa i rs , E Barrett pointed out in May 1914 that
"whi le the arrangements may be suspicious it is quite a di f ferent
(14)
matter to prove such suspicion by legal evidence." The fa i lu re
of government to take action against him pushed O'Neil to more
precocious defiance of the 1913 Act. In September he agreed to sell
Mooifoniein to Pixley Isaka ka Seme. It is not clear what the
connection between Ngema (who had the option of purchase) and Seme
was, but as ear ly as the f i rs t week of Apr i l 1914 Ngema had
contacted Saul Msane, a colleague of Seme's in the SANNC in connection
with the' sale. Once contact had been made, it seems as though Seme
took over Ngema's r ight to purchase.
Seme was involved in this transaction not for some a l t ru is t i c end,
but for p ro f i t . (A colleague of Seme's, RV Selope Thema, describes
Seme's land buy ing exploi ts in heroic terms, as part of an overal l
p lan to free the Afr ican from being 'a beast of bu rden ' . ) Seme
had formed the Native Farmers Association as a company to buy land
for Afr icans. This company bought Daggakraal , Driefontein and
Driepan in the Wakkerstroom d is t r i c t . Later on these farms became
well-known as blackspots, immortalized in their resistance to
resell lemenl and by the death, at the hands of policemen, of one of
their leaders, Saul Mkhize, in 1983. In a rather pecul iar way,
Seme has shared in the reflected glory of this resistance to the
state. This has bl inded observers to the true nature of Seme's land
purchases.
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Even before he got confirmation of his purchase of Mooifontein, Seme
was hard at work rest ructur ing property relat ions on the farm. All
those who could not or would not accept his ownership or pay the
(18)high rents he demanded were given just eight days to leave the farm.
Despite this harsh act ion, Seme's presence was welcomed by many of
the r icher Afr ican cu l t i va tors . They respected his legal knowledge
and felt secure under his protect ion. Seme's organisat ional powers,
they bel ieved, would succeed in gathering together many wealthy
Afr icans, in col lect ing their money and in buying the farm once and
for a l l . The d i f f i cu l t y in securing tenure was vast and it was a
comfort to know that no lesser person than Seme, Treasurer of the
SANNC and a lawyer from Egoli, was in charge.
By March 1916 Afr ican cu l t iva tors from as far af ie ld as Standerton
had settled on the farm. They paid Seme on average £62 each in
(19)the belief that they had thus purchased 10m.
In June 1916 as the prospects of Mooifontein becoming an Afr ican
cu l t i va tor base became more and more l i ke l y , charges in terms of
the 1913 Natives' Land Act were brought against Seme and O'Nei l .
A l i ng , the magistrate concluded mournful ly that "he could not see his
way to convict under the charge as framed by the Public Prosecutor,
and the accused were therefore found not gu i l ty and d ischarged."
In an effort hast i ly to confirm his legal tr iumph Seme appl ied to
have the farm registered in his name. In July 19)6 the Registrar
of Deeds refused to do this and the saga of. Mooifontein came to an
end. The inhabi tants were evicted and it is at least possible that
they lost the investments they had paid to Seme.
The case of Mooifontein throws l ight on three issues of importance in
agrar ian studies: ru ra l d i f fe rent ia t ion, land ownership and patterns
of resistance. I shal l examine these by lookinq at the Middelburg
d i s t r i c t , as a whole.
III.
The Middelburg d is t r ic t is d iv ided broadly into two zones: a northern
bush and low veld occupied mainly by Africans and the southern
highveld owned by whi tes. Agr icu l tu ra l prospects in the north were
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for the most part poor. The area contained " l i g h l , sandy so i l ,
(21 )interspersed with rocky koppies". Although the Ol'ifants and
Blood r ivers sk i r ted the area of Afr ican occupation, water was
general ly in short supply . Disease was widespread. The Afr icans
of the area "suffered from some disease or other, l ike syph i l i s ,
(22)
scurvy etc, and their animals had sickness a lso . " Part of the
explanat ion for the sorry state of a f fa i rs which existed before 1913
is to be found in the history of the area. The north had been
under continuous Afr ican occupation for a long time. Gradual ly
hemmed in by white settlement, Africans were no longer able to
(23)
pract ice sensible ecological pol ic ies. The area became over-
populated and competition for land between the area 's occupants(24)
occurred. By the second decade of the twentieth century, and
probably before th is , the area was exhausted - observers stated that
it contained only "old l and " .
The south, by contrast , was well-watered and fe r t i l e . In the late
19th century it had largely been cleared of Afr ican cu l t i va to rs .
Since the d i s t r i c t ' s white farmers only went in for agr icu l tu re in a
hal f -hearted way, much of the area was allowed to lie fa l low. In
the twentieth century therefore prospects of making a l i v ing by
agr icu l tu re were immeasurably better than in the nor th .
It should come as no surpr ise that the Afr ican cu l t iva tor l i v i ng in
the south ot^ a white farm was described as l i v ing the l i fe of "a
l i t t l e k i n g " . ' In 1913 most such Afr icans farmed q\ '.e Itirge plots
which they either rented for cash from white farmers or paid for
with their labour for three months of the year. Their prosper i ty was
(27)measured in the purchase of 'western clothes' and 'household f u r n i t u r e ' .
Not a l l Afr icans on the southern highveld enjoyed this progress. The
Ndebele ^ h o had been defeated and d is t r ibuted as labourers in 1883
were "as poor as mice". Many Ndebele worked a l l year round.
Most received only small plots and l imited grazing r i gh ts . A measure
of their poverty was that they wore skins and could not af ford
(29)consumer goods.
In the nor th , Afr ican cu l t iva tors were better off than the Ndebele
farm labourers. For one thing many of them l ived in locations set
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aside for their occupation. Here they were free from the labour
demands of farmers. Super f ic ia l l y , l i fe in the north appears to have
been easy. In recent studies on the 'peasantry ' in South Afr ica
 ( ,
it is often suggested that Afr icans in locations (and in areas which
later became reserves) were sheltered from state and cap i ta l is t forces
and were thus able to become re lat ive ly prosperous. This is far
from being the case in the eastern Transvaal . The Sub NC (SNC) of
the area commented in 1914 that Africans "merely grow suff icient for
their own use and lor t rad ing away for cotton goods and small
requirements1 ' . Many Afr icans in the area d id not have location
land on which to cu l t i va te and increasingly were forced to rent
(32)adjacent land for ag r i cu l tu ra l purposes. Such an exercise rare ly
gave the cu l t iva tor a chance to become market-or iented. Manure was
in short supply and fe r t i l i ze r too expensive. Perhaps most c r i t i ca l l y
however, the major market, Middelburg town, was 130 kilometres away.
There was no ra i lway or even a road motor service l ink ing the north
to the south, and few Afr icans in Nebo therefore were ever able to
make a l i v ing by agr icu l tu re alone.
Rising population added to the problems of Nebo cu l t i va tors . Natural
increase and the evict ion of labour tenants before the 1913 Act led
to a heavy demand being placed on the locations and neighbouring
(34)farms. Locations became severely overcrowded. In 1908 it was
calculated that Afr icans had access from 0.9m/person to 2.1m/person
in these locations. The inadequacy of this land can be ascertained
by looking at the conservative estimates of Afr ican land requirement
by Stubbs, later the chairperson of the Commitlee established to
recommend reserves for Afr ican in the eastern Transvaa l . Stubbs
estimated that each Afr ican family required 4m of agr i cu l tu ra l land
and 14^m of pastoral land. Afr icans soon spi l led on to white-owned
land. Here they faced land company rents and many were evicted
for their fa i lu re to pay. In addit ion white farmers entering the
area reduced the ava i lab le land to which Afr icans could move. By
the mid 1920s Nebo's economy was in tat ters.
The cash returns accruing to natives from the cu l t ivat ion
of the soil are negl ig ib le . . . . with a few exceptions (they)
do not cu l t iva te for a def ini te market . . . in the European
areas (on the other hand) the natives tend to cul t ivate
European crops to a somewhat greater extent than on the
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purely nat ive areas. In most cases the y ie ld from the
lands has tobe supplemented by the purchase of food.
Manual labour is almost invar iab ly the source of the
earnings required for the nay men t of taxes and the
purchase of necessaries.
Beinart has argued for Pondoland that the a b i l i t , to avoid migrant
labour was a cruc ia l element in ru ra l d i f fe rent ia t ion . If this is
appl ied to Nebo it w i l l be seen that most of the area 's populat ion
was far from prosperous, mostly below the subsistence leve. Whereas
in 1905 the SNC of Pokwant (Nebo) commented that "nat ives are
beginning to go out freely in search of employment", by 1910 a
combination of factors, including East Coast Fever had "compel led
young nat ive labourers to go out to work to earn money to purchase
(38)food." In 1909 the trend to migrancy was consolidated by the
establishment of a permanent labour recru i t ing officer in Nebo i tsel f .
In the same period traders began complaining that the "c i rcu la t ion
(39)
of coin has diminished very considerably".
From the above it should be clear that the Nebo locations and the
surrounding area (which was to become f i rs t a reserve and then the
Lebowa homeland) d id not harbour a large or prosperous cu l t i va tor
class. This is consistent with Lewis's f ind ing and those of Beinart
who argues that no 'peasant ry ' existed in Pondoland.
Yel there were isolated examples of r ich and successful Afr icans in
Nebo. Scattered references refer to "a nat ive who grows 800 bags of
corn" , another to somebody who grows "1000 bags of wheat pa" and
yet another to "a person who earns £600 a year . " But, as Percy
Greathead of the Transvaal Consolidated Land and Explorat ion Company
(41 )observed, "these are exceptions."
One of the rare exceptions was a man cal led Jan Mochadi. In 1913
Mochadi began to buy land on the farm Ui tkyk . By 1923 he had
secured 24m. His holdings might have been greater had he not lost
money through the destruction of his crops (locusts) and the unforseen
(42)expense of t rans fer r ing land, employing lawyers etc. In 1923 his
stock was valued at £300. Mochadi was regarded as a case of
exceptional success in Nebo, yet his achievements in absolute terms
were modest. He was l i t t le more than a small landowner and though
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he went in for agr icu l ture on his own account and employed Afr ican
labour, he made most of his money by rent ing to fellow Afr icans.
His land holdings nevertheless proved a secure base for accumulation.
By 1930 Mochadi and others had nearly f in ished paying for a large
(43)farm. Mochadi 's share was 700m. This was an impressive
achievement yet once again it needs to be seen in perspective. A
700m farm was, by white standards, not unduly large. More
importantly though, in 1930 Mochadi was one of only 16 or 17 Afr icans
owning land ind iv idua l l y in the d i s t r i c t . In the north therefore
wealthy landed Afr icans constituted a numerical ly ins igni f icant class.
The numbers of the wealthy and powerful were swelled to some extent
by chiefs and headmen. As Beinart has shown for Pondoland, chiefs
did not automatical ly transform themselves into commercial farmers,
yet "pre-colonial forms of rank and author i ty , which had implications
for wealth in terms of income and productive capaci ty , were to some
(44)
extent translated into the new (colonial) context."
There is l i t t l e hard evidence of chief ly wealth or agr i cu l tu ra l ac t i v i t y
in Nebo. Rather, there is evidence about the decline in their
author i ty . It is d i f f i cu l t to generalize about chiefs and their
relat ionships wi th the state and their subjects. In 1905 for example,
a f rustrated SNC reported that "the chiefs here, are of very l i t t l e
support to us" . On the other hand, it was reported in 1906 that
(45)
"the chiefs and natives were very respect fu l " . There were many
responses ava i lab le to chiefs and to understand these one would have
to have an indepth knowledge of each chieftaincy in the area.
Notwithstanding my ignorance of chieftaincy pol i t ics and the great
range in chief ly behaviour, it would be true to say that chiefs could,
and d i d , protect their ' fo l lowers ' from land encroachment. Afr icans
in ru ra l areas were aware of th is : a? a Mpondo tribesman put i t ,
"without chiefs we shall be l ike squat ters." The loyalty of
' fo l lowers ' for their chiefs was not automatic. From quite early on,
for many Nebo Afr icans the land question became subordinated to
concerns about geographical mobi l i ty and an ab i l i t y to f ind jobs in
the c i t ies. In other words as their rel iance on the land waned in
inverse proport ion to their growing dependence on wage labour, so
Afr icans became less w i l l i ng to respeel the author i ty of the chief and
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to invest in the land. This trend was noticed as early as 1910 when,
as has been noted, the locations were already showing signs of s t ra in
and an inab i l i l y to support their populat ions. "Many chiefs who in
the past were in receipt of substant ial incomes from their followers
(47)
this year (were) left wi th hard ly suff icient to meet their l i a b i l i t i e s . "
Resistance from migrants to chiefs grew when they began demanding
levies for land purchase. In 1922, "young men at work at labour
centres (have) refused to pay the levy . "
Chiefs as a group did not accept their loss of author i ty without a
f igh t . As a Native Af fa i rs department report put i t , they "zealously
fostered ( t r i ba l organisat ion as) their only means of control over their
(A9)fo l lowers." Since a large part of the chiefs' power rested on the
control and d is t r ibu t ion of land , it was in their interests to begin •
purchasing land. In this way they hoped to secure the loyal ty of
their ' f o l lowers ' . In this process they could legit imately claim to
be protect ing the land of ' fo l lowers ' from while encroachment. The
people who were most l ike ly to respond to the in i t i a t i ve of chiefs
were those who were not yet dependent on migrant labour and who
s t i l l saw a future for themselves in the countryside as cu l t i va tors .
Support for the chiefs from this class was not always forthcoming and
there were numerous points where f r ic t ion could result in a detachment
of support from a chief. The unfa i r d is t r ibu t ion of land or the demand
for labour (cither for the mines or for the ch ie f 's f ields) could result
in erstwhi le supporters of a chief t rekking away from his au thor i ty .
The ch ie f ' s re lat ionship with pr iva te Afr ican landowners is equal ly
complex. In some cases these landowners bought land in order to
remove- themselves from the orbi t not only of chief ly author i ty but of
the t r iba l system altogether - which seems to have been the case wi th
Mooifontein. In other cases t r iba l leadership disputes resulted in
one of the r i va l s sett ing himself up with a fol lowing on pr iva te land .
This was the case with Johannes Dinkwanyane in the mid 19lh century.
With Hans Merensky of the BMS, Dinkwanyane bought a farm near
Middelburg and established the Botshabelo settlement. Despite the
question of au thor i t y , there was enough common ground between
Afr ican landowners and chiefs for animosity to be diss ipated. Chiefs
and landowners both had an .interest in s tab i l i z ing property re lat ions
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and both functioned as rentier landlords - d i s t r ibu t ing land to tenants
in return for cash. It is not the intention to overdraw the s imi la r i t ies .
Obviously t r i ba l structures were very different from those that existed
on farms owned by Afr ican ind iv idua ls . Nevertheless, as Meintjes
comments, "the ownership of land became the means for a decl in ing
middl ing class to c l ing on to their class position wi th in a po l i t i ca l
economy where economic options were closing down." This was
also true for c h i e f s . < 5 3 a )
IV.
The question of Afr ican land purchase has not enjoyed much scholarly
at tent ion. This is not rea l ly surpr is ing since re lat ive ly l i t t l e land
was purchased by Afr icans. In the Transvaal between 1910-1912 for
example, only 78 farms (144 416m) costing £94 907 were registered by
(54)Afr ican owners. Nevertheless the fa i lu re to research the topic
has meant that a rather vague understanding of Afr ican land purchase
exists. The impression one gains is that almost any Afr ican 'peasant '
could buy land and that it was only the 1913 Land Act and other laws
(especially in the OFS) that prevented this from occurr ing. A l te rna t ive ly ,
it may be implied that the very success of squatter- farming on white
farms obviated the need for land purchase. This section of the paper
argues that only a very few Afr icans had the capi ta l to buy land .
This is important because it throws the prosperity of the peasantry
into question.
In order to understand land purchase it is necessary to grasp the
signif icance of the difference between ind iv idua l and communal tenure.
In the f i rs t category Afr icans are t ry ing to establ ish an independent
base in land, usual ly wi th the intention of making money. Ind iv idua l
tenure could be secured in two ways; by buying together with others
as a syndicate, or in buy ing on one's own. Communal ten-n-o can be
confused with syndicate purchase in that a number of people club
together to make the purchase. In the case of communal purchase
however, the purchase is engineered by chiefs in order to shore up
their author i ty by br ing ing their ' fo l lowers ' into a zone that is free
of rent demands and many of the government taxes. The land is
control led by the chief and headmen and held in trust by the Native
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Trust. So although an African might eventually pay quite a lot towards
the purchase of a farm, he would never have control over the land,
nor even unfettered access thereto. Where syndicates bought land,
each member had a legally sustainable claim to a portion of the land
and could do with that land what he chose. Since individual tenure
was a feature of the southern highveld and communal tenure was
characteristic of the north, we shall for convenience sake, discuss
land purchase by focussing on the two geographical areas of the district
separately.
The South
As has already been noted, very few Afr icans on the highveld purchased
land. This is perplex ing because, as the SNC of Nebo noted in 1917,
"the great desire of the nat ive to-day is some f i x i t y of tenure."
Why was purchase so rare? There are a number of explanat ions: Some
Afr icans who wanted to buy were unaware that after 1905 they were
allowed to. Another reason was that in some r ich larming areas,
land was not ava i lab le for purchase. But the most important reason
was the narrow l imit of Afr ican cu l t ivator capi ta l resources. In 1914
' SNC Edwards described these l imi tat ions;
"Unless they are helped by the Government it would
take a long time before natives could buy land. In
some instances it would be necessary for them to buy
land as soon as the law came into force on account of
the rent charged by the owners of the farms. It would
pay the natives to club together and buy in some cases.
The trouble is that the Natives cannot collect the money
al l at once . . . . they are not r ich i nd i v i dua l l y , but
col lect ively they are f a i r l y wealthy. Ind iv idua l ly . it
is out of the question for them to buy a fa rm. " * " '
There are a number of other possib i l i t ies to explain the scarcity of
Afr ican land purchase. Peter Delius has argued that, in Pedi land,
Afr icans believed that "the land belongs to us" and therefore saw no
reason to purchase. This explanation is un l ike ly to hold for the
southern h ighveld where there was no history of undisturbed Afr ican
occupation or successful resistance to white encroachment. A possible
explanat ion would be that squatters rent ing land d id well enough to
(58)see no reason to change. Like the poor whites, Afr ican cu l t iva tors
may have been only par t l y aware of the capi ta l is t forces that were
13.
bu i ld ing up and that these would eventual ly b r i ng their l i festyle to
(59)an end. Yet even this explanation is only convincing for those
who were sat isf ied with a l i festyle that necessitated periodic t rekk ing .
These people, it would seem, were as much concerned to avoid wage
labour as to transform themselves into prosperous farmers. As Cooper
says, "the defence of subsistence cu l t iva t ion remained an essential
part of cu l t i va to rs ' efforts to l imit the power of old oppressors and
new ones over them." Yet even for those engaged in a conservative
defence of subsistence cu l t i va t ion , security of tenure offered great
advantage. Squatters were frequently c r i t i c ised that they made no use
of i r r iga t ion or manure. While many white farmers put this down to
the backwardness of the Af r ican, Stubbs conceded that , "even the
advanced nat ive who has had opportunit ies of studying the methods of
the European makes l i t t l e or no use of a r t i f i c i a l aids of cu l t i va t ion .
This is not always due to lack of opportuni t ies. It may to some
extent be due to uncertainty of tenure." If therefore we are to
grapple with ' fhe peasant question1 in a way that Frederick Cooper
has suggested - to identi fy blockages that prevented cu l t iva tors from
becoming successful commercial farmers - we must place insecuri ty of
tenure high on the l ist of explanatory factors. As I have argued the
insecurity of tenure was predicated largely on the inab i l i t y of cu l t ivators
to mobilize capi ta l resources. This does not necessarily mean that
cu l t iva tors were a l l poor (though th is 'paper has argued that this
was true for the major i ty of the lowveld Af r icans) . Many had cat t le ,
but these were not easi ly transformed into capi ta l because the meat
market was oversuppl ied and the buyer therefore determined the pr ice.
In addi t ion market prices f luctuated w i l d l y . Similar problems beset
the sale of crops. Traders were able to f ix the price of gra in to the
disadvantage of the seller cu l t i va tor . For cu l t ivators near markets,
there was a better chance of gett ing a good pr ice: a deal could be
struck with a range of buyers including the local co-operative. Never-
theless, ag r i cu l tu ra l conditions at this time did not allow for great
prosper i ty . White farmers in par t i cu la r batt led throughout the 1910s
and 1920s to make headway against low pr ices, high costs of land and
fer t i l i ze r and a range of natural enemies (eg. drought, locusts, East
Coast Fever). Afr ican farmers were not immune to these problems and
it is not surpr is ing therefore that they found capi tal accumulation so
d i f f i cu l t . In some, if not many, cases successful agr i cu l tu ra l production
was only made possible by investments derived from wage labour. (62)
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In conclusion, many advantages pertained to ind iv idua l land tenure.
The land could serve as security for credi t , improvements (eg. i r r iga t ion)
could be made. In add i t i on , since the ind iv idua l farms I am ta lk ing
about were on the h ighveld near Middelburg, access to markets and
job opportuni t ies were fac i l i t a ted . When a crop fa i led it was always
comforting to know that wage labour was ava i lab le close by . The
residents of Doornkop for example, quite rap id ly bu i l t up a dependence
on wage labour in Middelburg and forsook commercial agr icu l tu re .
The reason why these advantages were not exploited lies in the poorly
developed state of the d i s t r i c t ' s 'peasantry ' and in the wider
d i f f i cu l t ies of capi ta l accumulation in agr icu l tu re .
In the North
In 1913 ten locations existed in northern Middelburg. These were densely
populated and many Afr icans resided on white-owned farms in the area.
Up un t i l this time there had been no attempt by Nebo's Afr icans to buy
land despite frequent complaints about land shortage. Even dur ing
the period 1905-1913 l i t t l e interest was shown, ind ica t ing , amongst
other th ings, a level of poverty already described.
There were two responses to the 1913 Act: Widespread condemnation
(par t i cu la r l y by squatters and OFS share-croppers and would-be Afr ican
land buyers l ike Seme) and cautious acceptance. As Beinart has shown
Afr icans in reserves believed the Act would protect them from white
encroachment and supported the Act for this reason. In the proposed
Middelburg reserve a very dif ferent s i tuat ion existed. Not a l l locations
had been included in the reserve and chiefs were v i r t ua l l y unanimous
in demanding that the reserve area be extended. Chief Lekoko of
Mooifontein location (which fel l outside the proposed reserve) for example
sa id , " I don ' t want the law of 1913 which gives us no r igh ts at a l l
to stand. That law has troubled us for many years. We want a law
which wi l l give us the r ight to buy g round . " For the Afr ican
cu l t i va to r in the proposed reserve the 1913 Act offered l i t t l e hope of
improvement. She/he probably paid rent to a land company. The
land company would continue to demand rent unt i l the farm was bought
by the t r ibe . To buy the land a levy would have to be raised from
the cu l t i va to rs .
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African representations to the NAD on the 1913 Land Act were pr imari ly
aimed at getting the Reserve ('scheduled area') extended and to get
the government to buy the land for African occupation. These
representations were par t ia l l y responsible for the Stubbs Commission
being set up in 1917. Stubbs was concerned that the quantity of
land set aside by the Beaumont Commission for Africans was inadequate,
and that the qual i ty of land was unsatisfactory. Stubbs' major
concern was for the 'Highveld' African and the Ndebele. In the case
of the former, Stubbs observed that "as a class, they are richer and
more prosperous than their compatriots of the lowveld. They are
Christians and have reached a higher stage of c iv i l isat ion, and they
have, to a large extent, freed themselves from the restraints of t r ibal
rule" Stubbs believed that the group should be provided with
highveld land. Stubbs urged in addition that a highveld reserve be
set aside for the Ndebele since they had no reserve at a l l . Although
it is not specifically stated Stubbs appears to have believed that
individual tenure for 'c iv i l ised natives' was acceptable. ' As far
as the lowveld Africans were concerned, Stubbs believed that their
reserve should be extended.
In the end, Stubbs was unable to f ind a suitable highveld reserve for
the Ndebele (see map). White farmer opposition was strident. Given
my earl ier remarks of the relative fai lure of African cult ivators, this
opposition might be perplexing. It is quite often suggested, for
example, that African competition with white farmers was an important
element generating pressure amongst white farmers for the 1913 Act.
There is l i t t le evidence for this in the Eastern Transvaal. In 1911,
Colonel Airey, a farmer in eastern Middelburg, complained that " I am
competing with Kafirs on very unfair grounds." This was however
a minority opinion. Farmers were anxious about two things: labour
and the long term implications of African land purchase on the highveld.
As Stubbs put i t , white farmers had "an almost sentimental attachment"
to the highveld.
Despite farmer opposition, Stubbs recommended an extension of the African
reserve southward, though his recommendation fell far short of the
suggestion of IK SNC for Pokwani who wanted al l of the locations to
fal l within the proposed reserve (see map). Stubb's report was not
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adopted in fu l l and the ' l and question1 remained unanswered unt i l
the 1936 Natives' Trust and Land Act. Many grey areas existed.
Stubbs for example, wanted ' neu t ra l ' areas declared which were ear-
marked for future Afr ican occupation but which had suff ic ient ly large
white populations to prevent ihei r rap id or immediate consolidation as
reserves. What this meant was that space existed for both Afr icans
and whites to contest the rac ia l zoning of land. A struggle, on the
land as opposed to in Parl iament, thus took place over the exact
dimensions of the reserves.
The migrat ion of whites into the Blood r iver - an area hitherto occupied
almost exclusively by Afr icans - began after the SA war. In 1904 there
were 25 families in the Blood r iver area. In 1917 there were 120
fami l ies. Many of these were poor tenant farmers t ry ing to escape
onerous rent conditions on the h ighveld . An increasing number however
were farmers who stamped their author i ty on their farms by evic t ing
Afr icans or demanding their labour. The two Greek farmers, Darras and
Patrojohn, are the best examples of th is . They settled on the Blood
r iver in 1916 and farmed wheat on a large scale.
Afr ican cul t ivators in the reserves watched the incoming tide of white
settlement with a larm. They could not do much about white settlement
outside the reserve, but wi th in the reserve they had the r ight to buy
land and in this way secure themselves against white encroachment. An
addi t ional incentive to buy was land company ownership of many farms
with in the reserve. Land companies ran their farms as businesses.
(72)Occupants who could not af ford the rents they charged were evicted.
Cul t ivators therefore wanted to remove land company influence and to
avoid their r i s ing rent demands. Another threat was posed by ind iv idua l
white landowners. Many of these contemplated farming their farms in
the reserve. Once again the only way to prevent this was to buy these
farmers out.
I have already argued that few Africans in Nebo had the capi ta l to buy
land, thus the most common form of land purchase by Afr icans was
communal tenure. Between 1917 and 1930 there were 19 cases of Afr ican
(73)t r iba l purchase. These purchases frequently d id not have the
support of the ch ie f 's ' fo l lowers ' and numerous cases of levy evasion
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occurred. So serious did this evasion become that in 1925 the Native
Taxation and Development Act was passed which made it a criminal
offence for an African to refuse to pay a levy.
The major stumbling block to consolidating the reserve in the hands of
Africans was the state's refusal to assist. The state refused either to
provide credit or to buy the land for Africans outright. So despite the
fact that the NAD continued to urge Africans to buy land, much of the
(74)
reserve remained in white hands throughout the 1920s and 1930s.
In 1921 two farmers, the Rousseau brothers, bought the farms Weltevreden
and Zoetevelden from land companies (see map). These farmers were in
the heart of the reserve but since the land problem had not been solved
and the areas of African occupation had not yet f inal ly been decided,
the purchase went through. Africans who had paid rent were suddenly
evicted, or forced to pay £20 pa (as opposed to £1 pa plus grazing fees
charged by land companies). Alternatively, they were forced to become
(75)
labour tenants. The worst fears of African cultivators were thus
realized. The NAD appeared to be powerless and so the local Africans
took matters into their own hands. In 1923 the first signs of resistance
occurred. Large amounts of wheat were stolen. The Rousseaus responded
first by impounding and then shooting 'stray' animals. In a fiery climax,
the wheat crops of four white farmers, including the Rousseaus were
torched in December 1924. The Rousseaus were not prepared for this
level of attrit ion and just over a year later, sold out to Chief Lekoko
who had been interested in buying the land all along.
The incendiarism of 1924 marked the high point of African resistance
and signalled the start of a white farmer retreat out of the reserve.
The defence of the reserves is a neglected aspect of 5A rural history.
Marian Lacey has shown that the reserves got steadily smaller as the
Mines and farmers hammered out an agreement over a national native
policy, but her work does not reveal the actual struggle by Africans
themselves, for land.
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have thus far suggested that land purchase was a class response to
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the spread of capital ism in South Af r ica . (This argument para l le ls that
of Mike Morris which suggested that townward migrat ion was an a l ternat ive
(77)form of class response to that of resistance. ) The response took
different forms.: ind iv idual tenure for the wealthy cu l t ivators and com-
munal tenure for chiefs and reserve cu l t i va tors . There were obviously
other responses to capi ta l ism. In this f inal section I shall investigate
class d i f fe rent ia t ion, organisations and resistance.
(78)
The SA war gave the chiefs of the north a ' taste of freedom'. White-
owned land was occupied and catt le seized. In the southern highveld
too, Afr ican cu l t iva tors revel led in conditions where farms were abandoned.
After the war the Milner administrat ion assisted Boer farmers to take back
their farms and thereafter fac i l i ta ted the spread of capi ta l is t relat ions(79)in the countryside. The 'taste of freedom1 was followed by a b i t ter
aftertaste. On the highveld African cu l t ivators who were being squeezed
off the land were in 1909 reported to display a "very d isrespect fu l ,
independent and disobedient demeanour." In the north, on the contrary,
despite the breakdown of Nebo's economy and increases in rent by some
landlords, there was s t i l l a large measure of respect for author i ty . In
the fol lowing year, 1910, the f i rs t signs of ru ra l strain and accompanying
defiance were reported from Nebo. Demands for labour by white landowners
(81 )provoked a "semblance of passive resistance". In the south too, efforts
to d isturb Doornkop's residents led to defiance. By 1910 therefore,
cul t ivators both on the highveld and in the bushveld were responding to
the extension of white control in agr icu l ture with a scattered and un-
organised stand against au thor i ty . Some chiefs too were f ract ious. In
1909 Chief Hlakudi refused to comply with an NAD command concerning
marriage practices in his t r ibe . He was alleged to have obstructed the
police in their duties and to have been " insolent" . Hlakudi objected to
NAD interference in his t r i be ' s a f fa i rs and to police act ion: " I am
inquar ing by thee it is lawful to send your Police boys to rush into my
kraa l and arrest ing my people without saying anyth ing to me." But the
under ly ing f r ic t ion emanated from the mass evict ions of Africans from a
nearby farm.
During the 1910s the undisturbed cul t ivators (especially on the highveld)
and the wealthy, prospective landowners and most of the chiefs were
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re la t ive ly contented. The 1913 Act changed th is , but evidence of class
di f ferent iat ion can nevertheless be observed in the dif ferent responses
to the Act. Jacob Masuto, a Middelburg labour tenant, expressed his
disgust before the Stubbs Commission. " I have heard that you have
come to speak only of the ground. I know that we are a l l sick of the
(831
word. We see that there is no chance for us . " Chief Lekoko's unhappy
reception of the 1913 Act has already been noted (see p. 14 above). The
rather truculent at t i tudes of labour tenants and chiefs can be contrasted
with that of the Afr ican landowner, Jan Mochadi. "We would be thankful
(84)if the government would put us where we want . "
The major focus of resistance to the Act came from the SANNC. This body
managed to combine the pol i te objections of asDirant landowners l ike
Mochadi with the more raucous dissent of ejected sharecroppers, squeezed
labour tenants and aggrieved chiefs. It is nevertheless necessary to
make the point that di f ferent class concerns were only br ie f ly meshed
and that before long the class al l iance resist ing the 1913 Act would fa l l
(84a)apar t .
Mochadi and Seme represented a st i f led class of landowners. They resented
an act that, to use the words of another leading SANNC f igure , Selby
Msimang, "debarred (nat ives) from purchasing land wherever they choose."
The Land Act k i l l ed off the chance of a v iable 'peasantry ' and an Afr ican
rentier landlord class. For those who wanted to climb the social ladder
this was a very serious blow. For most other Africans however, land
ownership was nothing but an unreal izable dream. For them, the Land
Act did not block their progress, so much as hasten their decl ine.
Squatters l ike 'Masuto' were by 1913 already harr ied by white landowners.
What the 1913 Act did was to t i l t the balance decisively in favour of the
white landowners.
This d ist inct ion is important because it shows lhat the African a l l iance
against the Act wa= tenuous. One has only to see the harsh way in
which Seme evicted Afr ican cu l t ivators from Mooifontein to realize that
his rhetoric was nol matched by a material commitment to the l iberat ion
of the 'b lack man ' . What real ly worried Seme was any attempt to
l imit indi vidua I land ownership. There were c lear ly many SANNC
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members who thought along s imi lar lines to Seme. In 1911 they decided
to send a deputation to the Minister of NA to protest the Native Settlement
and Squatters Registration B i l l "which amongst other things debarred
(87)Afr ican syndicates from buying l and . "
Recent studies of ideology, resistance and leadership have stressed complex
linkages with po l i t i ca l economy and have cal led for an end to the crude
collaborator - non-col laborator dichotomy. This paper is cognisant
of the advances made in this f ie ld of scholarship and attempts to locate
the various forms of Afr ican ' resistance' wi th in the matr ix of class
re lat ions. Whereas Bradford argues that the ICU leaders in the 1920s
were less bourgeois than they have been made out to be, this paper
argues that Seme, s t i l l a somewhat shadowly f igure in SA history but
wi th a reputat ion of being the most conservative leader the ANC ever had,
can best be understood by looking at his dealings as landlord. This is
a factor often observed but the signif icance of which is rare ly commented
upon or explained.
In 1913 the SANNC made l i t t l e attempt to capital ize on the ' inso lent '
demeanour of Afr ican cu l t i va to rs . Its well-known tactic of pol i te po l i t ics
- deputations, letters and interviews - had l i t t le need of the growing
dissat isfact ion wel l ing up amongst those Middelburg cul t ivators under
threat of being converted into labourers. The SANNC put l i t t l e energy
into ru ra l organisat ion and, as far as Middelburg was concerned,
satisf ied itself wi th sending Saul Msane on a membership and finance
dr ive in 1913. Details are sketchy but if Msane's role in the Mooifontein
episode is anything to go by, the aim was to garner support from the
wealthier cu l t ivators rather than to create a prototype for the later ICU.
For f ive years after 1913 the SANNC appears to have done nothing in
Middelburg. A possible by-product was that, in contrast to the period
just before 1910, NAD of f ic ia ls reported that Middelburg 's Afr icans
exhibi ted "un fa i l i ng loyalty and good behaviour". The submissiveness
of Middelburg 's Afr icans was not a measure of improvements in the ru ra l
economy. Migrancy continued to escalate. Chiefs may have been par t l y
mol l i f ied by their ab i l i t y to buy land but their ' fo l lowers ' suffered
from the weight of a fur ther £1 for the levy. An indication that a l l
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was not well dur ing the First World War and in the immediate post-war
years is to be found in the refusal of Africans to testi fy before the Stubbs
(91 )Commission. As Phil Bonner has convincingly expla ined, the years
1917-20 saw the radica l ization of the TNC. The organisat ion 's con-
servative petty bourgeois leadership was nudged into support ing str ikes
and open defiance of the state. This development pushed the TNC
leadership to reassess its ru ra l po l icy .
"Both Maghatho (TNC President) and Ramailane were
increasingly preoccupied wi th ru ra l problems, and in
the process s t r i k ing a closer al l iance with chiefs.
What this heralded, in pa r t , was the growth of a
rura l populist movement, which would reach f ru i t ion
after the decline of urban agi tat ion in late 1920." '9
In line with this shift TNC organisers began p l ann ing ' a st r ike in Middel-(93)
burg in July 19)9. There is no record of such a st r ike having
occurred in 1919 or 1920. In 1924 however, came the incendiary attack
in Nebo. The Rousseau brothers suspected that their enemies in the
locations were being organised.
"Lately they have gone on s t r ike , and not even the
police have been able to induce them or compel them
to turn out to work . . . (they are) attending meetings
at the kraa ls of the chiefs, conducted mostly by two
natives who recently a r r ived here from an unknown
place."(94)
The Rousseau brothers were at least pa r t i a l l y correct. According to NAD
reports the burning of crops and the attacks on stock (which were
re lat ive ly isolated) were prompted by harsh l i v ing and working condit ions
on the farms concerned and were not part of an organised campaign. Yet,
at the same time, NAD of f ic ia ls freely admitted that there were act ive
TNC members in the area and that these people had recently inspired a
number of s t r ikes.
Farmers in the adjacent area of Pediland were quite sure about the
organisat ion of Afr icans. "Recently local natives had had ideas put into
their heads which did not exist be fore . . . (by) educated natives (who)
have been making collections for the Native National Congress, or
whatever it is ca l l ed . "
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Another suspected source of these 'ideas' were members of the Pedi royal
family. These people, it was alleged, were preaching a "Doctrine of
Equality" which was translated into the message that Africans should
not "work for the white people and not pay tax to the Government, as
this part of the country belongs to the Natives." Significantly this
interpretation was badly dented when a Sub Inspector discovered that
the sullen mood resulting from contact between members of the Royal
family and commoners was caused by demands for tribal levies which
were felt to be excessive, rather than the "Doctrine of Equality".
Without knowing a lot more about African politics in the area it is
impossible to come to firm conclusions about the level or type of
organisation.
But for our purposes there are two points to note in the events of 1924.
Firstly despite advanced differentiation, a chief and his followers
ranging possibly from a migrant recently returned from the mines to
cultivators who had yet to be fully subordinated to a wage labour system
were brought together in defence of their land. This alliance in concert
with TNC organisers showed the potential for resistance in the reserves.
Secondly there is no evidence that landholders like Mochadi either led
or joined such movements.
The possibility of further alliances between chiefs and cultivators was
temporarily ended by three factors:
1) the decline of the TNC as a radical organisation and the end of
its rural organising;
2) the change in slate policy around 1925 to "delegate power to tribal
i ay |
chiefs" and thereby bolster their waning power. (This can be
seen in the 1925 Natives Trust and Development Ac l ) ;
3) the downward sp i ra l of cu l t i va to r fortunes which made the levy
demands of chiefs burdensome and increased the bar r ie rs between
themselves and the chiefs. The po l i t i ca l direct ion taken by chiefs
appears to have been to close the distance with Afr ican landowners
and the v iab le cu l t i va to rs . The act iv i t ies of the ICU in this
period seem not to have disturbed this development.
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In 1925 the ICU organiser, Thomas Mbeki ar r ived in Middelburg. His
energies seem to have been concentrated on the area in and around
Middelburg town. He set himself up in the Middelburg urban location,
much to the consternatnion of the supervisor. "Thomas Embike", he
reported, "has for the last 4 months been poisoning the minds of the
(98)location with te l l ing the natives they are on the same footing as Europeans."
ICU meetings were held at Botshabelo and probably at other highveld
venues.
Bradford suggests that in the Transvaal , " labour tenants, ' squa t te rs ' ,
(99)sharecroppers, chiefs and their t r iba l fol lowers" supported the ICU.
The evidence avai lab le in Middelburg however suggests that labour tenants,
threatened 'squat ters ' and urban location dewllers were the mainstay of
ICU support. The inhabitants of the reserve from migrant -cu l t iva tors
through to r ich landowners appear not to have been reached by the ICU.
ICU supporters withheld their labour, held meetings of protest and
developed a defiant at t i tude towards employers. What the at t i tude of the
local chiefs was towards the ICU is d i f f i cu l t to ascerta in. In Nelsprui t ,
Swazi chiefs had led their 'fol.lowers' into The ICU, whereas in the
western Transvaal the ICU had been seen as "a k ind of substitute for their
chiefs". The fact that pitsos were held regular ly between Middelburg 's
NAD of f ic ia ls and Nebo's chiefs in this period and that there is no mention
of the ICU at these meetings suggests that the ICU made l i t t le impact in
the nor th.
What of the inhabi tants in the northern reserve? There was at least one
possible avenue of action open to reserve dwellers other than support ing
the ICU. They may have consolidated their v ictory at Zoetevelden and
Welgevonden with a conservative response - sought to stabi l ize their
position rather than revolutionize i t . Al ternat ively they might have
embraced the ICU message of change. The latter seems less l ike ly because
by 1926, the tide of white encroachment had turned. The ICU's message
was qeared to people under the control of or in the employ of whites.
This no longer a p p l i f J in Nebo.
In 1930 Chief Lekoko testi f ied to the undisturbed development of an al l iance
between chiefs and landowners by asking for pr iv i leges on behalf of and
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for both chiefs and landowners. He asked, for example, that
"nat ive chiefs and native landowners" be supplied with free dog badges.
Although the chiefs appeared to accept the landowners to the same station
as themselves, they were v ig i lan t lest 'pretenders' exploit NAD regulat ions
to have themselves declared chiefs. In protection of their status chiefs
frequently sought assurance that only those with "royal blood" be
appointed as chiefs. The chiefs did want to avoid a l ienat ing their
beleaguered ' fo l lowers ' and continued to be active in asking for
concessions on their behalf .
In 1930 the man on whom Middelburg's aspirant Afr ican landowners had
pinned their hopes resurfaced, this time as President of the ANC. All
the hal lmarks of his involvement in the Mooifontein land purchase were
s t i l l v is ib le - commitment to ' free enterpr ise ' , loyalty to chiefs, deference
for authori ty and a thorough d is l ike of rad ica ls . He formed African
Congress Clubs, one of the benefits of which was to enable "chiefs to get
their motor cars more cheaply". He urged "educated young men and
women not to lose contact with your own t r ibes" and he expressed the
belief that "the duty of the Congress ( is) to satisfy the Minister of Native
Affa i rs of our good intent ions". His policy of "economic sel f -help"
and re integrat ing chiefs plunged the ANC to the nadir of its fortunes.
Seme's ' l i t t l e game' at Mooifontein in 1915 had fai led to ignite Afr ican
cul t ivators to resist the 1913 Land Act. And this had not been its purpose.
In 1930 Seme's ANC fai led once again to appeal meaningful ly to ru ra l
subsistence cul t ivators and migrants. The ' l i t t l e game' at Mooiiontein
provides some clues to explain this fa i lu re .
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to di f ferent iate Midde lburg ' t cu l t iva tors . It
suggests that in the f i rs t decade of the 20th century most cul t ivators were
poor and dependent on wage labour. This challenges the f indings
of Bundy and Keegan which suggest that Afr ican cul t ivators were re la t ive ly
prosperous and v iab le , even after the 1913 Act. My f indings tend
rather to provide empirical support for Mike Morr is 's contention that
Afr ican cul t ivators outside the reserves had lost their independence and
were effectively wage labourers by "at least the second decade of the
twentieth century . "
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Widespread poverty among most African cul t ivators prevented a solid
challenge being launched against white ownership of, and therefore control
over, the land. There were a few wealthy Afr icans, often with urban
cap i ta l , who were able to buy land and secure an African foothold in
'white areas ' . It was this ' l i t t l e game1 that the wealthy white farmers
and the state sought to 'p ip in the b u d ' . The 1913 Natives' Land Act
was the tool they used. Keegan has pert inent ly pointed out that " leg is-
lat ive edict and administrat ive f iat have l i t t le force in shaping the
substance and context of class struggle unless the material conditions are
also propit ious". But Keegan was ta lk ing of OFS sharecropping. In
the case of Transvaal land purchase, where the Registrar of Deeds was
the f inal arbi ter , legislative edict was a powerful and indeed f inal
decider against a permanent presence of African commercial farmers near
markets. For periodisation purposes, therefore, the importance of the
1913 Act must be stressed.
In the northern lowveld there was legislat ive confusion ar is ing out of the
confl ict ing recommendations about the borders of the reserve. This confusion
was exploited by white farmers. Capital ist forces personified by wealthy
white farmers pushed into areas hitherto exclusively occupied and cul t ivated
by Afr icans. These farmers did not 'stop' at the borders of the reserve.
White encroachment threatened subsistence cu l t i va t ion , the authori ty of the
chiefs and the chance for the more prosperous cul t ivators to succeed on
the land. II was the opposition generated by white intrusion that secured
the reserve for exclusive African occupation. Too often the reserves have
been regarded as places where Africans were forced to migrate and l ive .
This i? true, par t icu lar ly for the modern period. But we need also to
remember the struggle of Africans to hang on to the miserly 13% of land
they had been allocated by the state. A struggle it should be added,
that is s t i l l being waged by threatened black spot communities today.
F ina l ly , this paper suggests that rura l di f ferent iat ion is important in
expla in ing the variet ies of class resoonse. Land purchase was one of
these class responses albeit a poorly developed one. I have suggested
that the reason for this lies in the relat ive poverty of the 'peasant ry ' .
Outright resistance was another response, and i ron ica l ly , an equally rare
one. In this case the limited instances of resistance can, be explained
26.
with reference to the limited success of organisations, such as the TNC,
and class differences between reserve dwellers - chiefs, landowners,
viable cul t ivators, migrant-cult ivators. The f inal class response
that this paper attempts to shed light on is that of Pixley isaka ka Seme.
His dealings at Mooifontein betrayed his class or ig ins, so did his leader-
ship of the ANC 1 9 3 0 - 4 . " " '
27.
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